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Despite considerable and miscellaneous research in transition economics, some 
of its aspects have yet to evolve and come up with a more standard theory. After 
the initial systemic change in two versions of socialist systems – centralist in the 
former Soviet Union (FSU), and self-management in the former Socialist Federal 
Republic  of  Yugoslavia  (SFRY),  and  rush  towards  a  market-based  system, 
setbacks  in  economic  performance  were  marked  by  a  sharp  decline  in  living 
standards for the majority of population. A soar in socio-economic trauma during 
economic transformation from self-management to a (full) market economy along 
with civil wars, has mostly hit the middle class bringing them around the poverty 
line.  Although  economic  recovery  and  growth  picked  up  after  a  decade  of 
downturn to reach the pre-transition level, the rise in income differentiation has not 
changed much the situation of poverty which in the former SFRY countries (except 
Slovenia)  remains  widespread,  whereas  it  has  made  a  tiny  minority  better-off, 
namely private entrepreneurs, politicians and professionals. Yet, this polarisation 
may  be  natural  after ownership  transformation  and  privatisation  in  the  short  to 
medium run. But among majority who slide towards poverty, there were, and still 
are,  nostalgic  attitudes  about  economic  welfare  in  the  previous  system.  The 
pressure for more socially-oriented economic reforms has mainly come from this 
group,  though  policy  makers  too,  were  aware  that  this  approach  which  is 
necessary to fix structural-adjustment problems, is more likely to be successful at 
aggregate level for sustainable and long term development,  ceteris paribus. By 
looking back at the previous system and exploring current social and economic 
reforms in the former SFRY, this paper aims at investigating common points and 
theoretical convergences between self-management socialism and social market 
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Capitalism has won the battle against the Communism but has the first won the 
battle  within  its  own  versions?  Recent  global  financial  crisis  coming  from  the 
United States and spreading to Europe and elsewhere with the fear of leading to a 
worldwide economic recession, has exploded the interests of various scholars and 
ordinary citizens, let alone economists, to know something or as much as they can 
about different economic systems and their alternatives. Adam Smith‟s view of free 
market economy as everlasting system for humanity, and the critique of Karl Marx 
that capitalism does not have where to go except to its death, today appear as 
claims in between where there are alternatives.   
 
The rise of the FSU as a socialist country after World War II (WWII) as a great 
power, had pushed many governments in many capitalist countries to nationalise 
some industries and increase the role of the state in the economy. For some time, 
many  people  and  communist  governments  perhaps,  were  convinced  that 
capitalism  may  make  the  way  to  socialism  and  not  the  other  way  around. 
Socialism  was  built  on  the  basis  of  critical  view  of  capitalism  –  the  Marxist 
approach.  Capitalism gained  reputation for ruthless  exploitation  of  the  workers, 
which was very true when Marx was criticising it. However, capitalism was not a 
static system and evolved by improving the working and living conditions of the 
workers substantially. The fear that people may aspire and be committed to fight 
for  socialist  model,  required  that  capitalism  should  treat  the  workers  more 
humanly. The fight for more rights and democracy were found in the initial phase 
of capitalist development as the English Civil War (1642-1651 and 1648–1649) 
and American Civil War (1861–1865). Apart from struggles for better treatment in   4 
both systems – capitalism and socialism – alternative models were put in place by 
not  changing  the  ideology  or  substance.  One  of  them  is  the  model  of  SMEC 
combining  market  and  competition  with  active  role  of  the  state  as  a  regulator 
without  the  need  to  evolve  or  become  socialist;  the  other  is  self-management 
socialism  with  market  in  operation  and  indicative  planning  by  the  state  which 
remains socialist or communist.  
 
Lack of a theory on transition from centrally planned and market socialism to an 
open  market  economy  has  generally  been  blamed  as  one  of  the  main  causes 
leading  to  many  undesirable  surprises  in  the  last  decade  of  the  20
th  century. 
Broadly  summarising,  with  some  exceptions,  common  unexpected  failures 
involved: violent break ups of some countries and the establishment of new states 
in the FSU, SFRY
1 (former Czechoslovakia split peacefully), sharp decline in the 
living standards as a result of the fall in output, job cuts through restructuring and 
rising unemployment, high human cost of transition (the rise or orga nised crime, 
prostitution, death rates, fall in marriage and fertility rates), and many more.  
 
Many communist countries facing political and economic disorganisation in the 
1990s  were  not  quite  aware  how  difficult  transition  or  the  road  ahead  was. 
Przeworski (1991) asserted that the change which was about to occur through 
economic  reforms  and  resource  reallocation  will  be  painful  for  majority  and 
beneficial  for few,  so  taken  as  a  whole,  countries  at  national  level  will  face 
deteriorated economic performance and recession for some time. By the same 
token, Hellman (1998) later would argue and admit that high social costs in the 
early transition has made the majority losers, and the few who benefited were 
actually those who initiated the reforms. It was this in cidence of polarisation and 
unhappiness demanding either better model, or the reforms to be more socially -
oriented. The SMEC is one of the models fitting in the requirements towards this 
aim.  
                                                 
1 Yugoslavia adopted this name from 1963 until 1991 when it disintegrated. From 1943 to 1946 it was known 
as  Democratic  Federal  Yugoslavia,  then  from  1946  to  1963  it  became  Federal  People’s  Republic  of 
Yugoslavia. All in common, it is about Communist Yugoslavia.      5 
Since  SMEC  is  a  very  broad  concept  and  a  sophisticated  model,  this  paper 
discusses  only  some  of  its  core  objectives  and  phenomena  that  are  more 
important,  in  particular  those  elements  that  can  be  either  compared  to  market 
socialism  or,  to  the  policies  in  place  in  the  successor  states  of  the  former 
Yugoslavia.    Section one  discusses  theories  of evolution and  transformation of 
economic  systems  with  a  specific  reference  to  centralist  and  self-management 
socialism.  The  first  model  was  imposed  by  the  FSU  in  Central  and  Eastern 
European  (CEE)  countries,  introduced  endogenously  in  China  and  Cuba,  and 
supported by the FSU in Vietnam and North Korea. In communist Yugoslavia, the 
latter  socialist  model  (self-management)  was  endogenously  developed  and 
became  much  different  from  socialism  elsewhere  in  the  world.  The  section 
provides the main reasons and causes that led to this unique economic model. 
Section  two  looks  at  what  was  specific  to  self-management  socialism  and 
compares its features with major concepts of SMEC. It then continues with a sub-
section to find possible convergent and divergent points between the two models. 
Development disparities between the regions of the SFRY were huge and they 
appear  to  have  deepened  in  the  course  of  transition.  This  is  can  be  found  in 
section three that refers to some figures measuring the level of development such 
as,  GDP  per  capita,  Gini  Coefficient,  unemployment  and  poverty  presented  in 
Appendix  to  this  Paper,  and  which  in  the  section  are  associated  by  some 
theoretical discussion. The discussion in section four tries to find and justify what 
would be an appropriate economic model for the successor states of the former 
Yugoslavia in the near future and medium term. In this respect, the focus is in 
SMEC. Given that this model is at a nascent phase and not officially enforced, 
conclusions  that  are  drawn  in  section  five  leave  some  questions  for  further 
discussion on this topic.        
 
1. Theoretical background on transformation and/or evolution of economic 
systems      
 
If  in  the  introduction  part  the  lack  of  comprehensive  theories  on  transition  or 
transformation  of  economic  systems  was  superficially  referred  to,  this  section   6 
explores the matter in more details. While this vacuum in theory is largely justified, 
there existed models in operation where former socialist economies wanted to go, 
which mostly turned out to be the model based on the Washington Consensus. 
Perhaps what has been missing, with few exceptions, is the explanation about the 
emergence of this lack of a theory on transition. Taking a look at the past, some 
attempts can be found in trying to generate such theories, which may be a good 
lesson  to  study  the  importance  of  evolution,  transition  and  transformation  of 
existing  systems  into  other  ones,  or  even  quite  new.  It  is  obvious  that  in  the 
second case – quite new system(s) – the point is not related to any prophecy or 
something  fictional,  but  to  establish  reasonable  theories  for  which  there  is  a 
consensus that they were missing during transition from communism to a market 
economy. 
 
Going  back  to  the  1930s,  in  the  former  SU  as  a  pioneer  country  of  socialist 
system,  the  main  proponents  of  more  liberal  model  or  market  socialism  were 
executed and their writings banned. Against the attempts proposing to incorporate 
market elements in the Chinese socialism which then was similar to that of the 
former  SU  (1949-1970),  the  Communist  Party  had  reacted  by  interning  and 
marginalising  the  advocates  of  those  ideas  to  the  countryside.  Their  writings 
remained outside the scope of the government‟s determination and were never 
taken into consideration (Nolan, 1995:45). Thus the core reason why transition 
from communism to a market economy in the late 1980s did not have elaborated 
and comprehensive theories, was because the Party prosecuted those who had 
the knowledge or were able to present alternatives to the communism in force, 
therefore those theorists were prosecuted as counter revolutionaries.   
 
What  had  failed  in  the  SU  and  China  eventually  made  the  way  through  to 
functioning  in  the  former  SFRY  as  self-management  or  market  socialism.  It 
remains  ambiguous  whether  the  Yugoslav  government  headed  by  differently 
named communist party (the League of Communists of Yugoslavia – LCY) would 
have had tolerated theories and advocates of a different system in the aftermath of 
WWII, where her model was a copy from the SU. In fact, it was the LCY itself that   7 
came  out  with  the  ideas  to  introduce  market  elements  and  “socialist  market 
economy” model. The evidence available suggests that this by no means was any 
theoretical wisdom of the Yugoslav communists, but was imposed unavoidably in 
specific historical circumstances, and was a result of one or more causes leading 
to a particular alternative development. 
 
A considerable number of authors believe that the expulsion of Yugoslavia from 
the  Cominform
2  in 1948, had a cruc ial impact on Yugoslavia embarking on a 
separate road and speeding up the decentralisation process.
3 Once Yugoslavia 
was excluded from the Cominform and denounced as a traitor, the Soviet Union 
and the Eastern block imposed economic blockade against her. Y ugoslavia thus 
found itself isolated from the East and in increasing need of cooperation with the 
West.  It  became  obvious  that  the  Soviet  type  socialism  could  no  longer  be 
maintained as the Eastern block was bringing no benefits but blackmails to accept 
subordination which Yugoslavia had rejected. This corresponded with the period in 
which the central planning system was gradually dismantled (1948 -1952), though 
some decentralised planning remained. Just on the way of implementing the 
differentiated  socialist  model,  Kardelj  and  Djilas  (1951)  were  warning  that 
socialism at that time must never be considered as a static model.
4 The authors 
recognised the socialist model in the FSU which SFRY initially copied, as a step 
forward  compared  to  capitalism,  but  in  “due  time”  blamed  it  for  becoming  an 
impediment for further progress, therefore maintained that socialism has to evolve. 
Once the new  version of socialism was adopted without knowing how it  would 
                                                 
2 The Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) was an organisation established in 1947 acting as a tool 
of Soviet foreign policy with the mission to coordinate actions and encourage unity between communist 
parties under Soviet direction.   
3 See e.g., Djilas (1951), Kardelj and Djilas (1951), Singleton and Carter (1982), Prout (1985), McFarlane 
(1988), Lydall (1984), Dyker (1990). A detailed discussion of the dispute between Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union, in particular the ex pulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform can be found in Clissold (1973). As 
Clissold shows, in 1948 Stalin complained to the Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito of the anti -Soviet 
atmosphere in Yugoslavia and shortcomings of the CPY. The Soviet Union had called on the CPY to replace 
its leaders. CPY rejected those charges and declared its solidarity with Tito. The dispute was aggravated and 
turned to the threat of an armed invasion in 1949, but Tito made it clear that Yugoslavia would resist any 
attack.    
4 Kardelj (1948) was already trying to justify an alternative way of socialism to FSU when he delivered the 
speech to the Peoples’ Assembly of the SFRY on 25 April 1948, where he talked about Weaknesses and 
Imperfections of Building up our [Yugoslav] Economy.    8 
operate  and  the  likelihood  of  its  performance,  Kardelj  (1954)  casted  the  main 
theoretical basis of this socialist establishment for the state and the economy.  
 
It evolved in SFRY by reinterpreting the Marxist concepts to which the communists 
were  very  loyal,  and  made  their  socialist  version  more  market  oriented,  self-
managed and allowed greater scope of private property (Lichtheim, 1969). Lydall 
(1984) maintains that the Yugoslav communists were not socialists at heart but 
even Stalinists. Their fear was that by giving up socialism, which they were closer 
than ever after the split with SU, would mean losing the power which they were not 
prepared to do so. Despite introducing a special and unique version of socialism, 
the  Yugoslav  communists  were  not  prepared  to  move  further  in  allowing  the 
system to evolve beyond socialist ideology. This can be proven with the case of 
Milovan  Djilas  who  was  one  of  the  main  and  closest  allies  of  Josip  Broz  Tito 
(president of the LCY and of the SFRY) and key player in the LCY. Djilas was also 
the main architect of ideological split with Stalin, had started to write against Soviet 
hegemonic tendencies over Yugoslavia appeared as early as in the first days of 
liberation. He and many top Yugoslav communists were not happy how socialism 
was  implemented  in many  countries  where  the  working  class  did  not have  the 
power in its hands (Djilas, 1946). The pressure aimed at subordinating Yugoslavia 
by the SU led to Yugoslav leaders advocating that each country should develop 
according  to  its  own  will  and  conditions  (Djilas,  1951).
5  As there was no any 
elaborated theory available for self -management socialism, Djilas later declared 
that his idea of “factories to the workers” had accidently come to his mind after 
rereading the Capital of Karl Marx and discussing with Boris Kidrič in a car park.
6 
Before publishing his book The New Class in 1957, he was dismissed from the 
                                                 
5 As already stated, the Yugoslav leaders were not the first not to agree or oppose the bureaucratic reality of 
Soviet socialism. We find such a criticism much earlier even among Soviet rulers such as Trotsky, architect 
and the leader of the Red Army from 1918 to 1925. Trotsky (1937 [1973]) stood for permanent revolution on 
international perspective of socialism and opposed Stalin’s socialism in one country (in the Soviet Union). 
Lenin had warned that eventual coming to power of Stalin would change the direction of the revolution 
because, he saw Stalin as vicious and violent. The degeneration of socialism which was taking place under 
the Stalinist bureaucracy was described by Trotsky as the revolution betrayed.   
6 The famous slogan “factories to the workers” that Djilas explored in his 1957 book The New Class: An 
Analysis of the Communist System, had become the corner stone of theoretical and practical differentiation of 
Yugoslav self-management socialism from centralist system in the FSU.    9 
CPY  (in  1954),  arrested  and  sentenced  to  nine  years  in  prison  (on  1956)  on 
charges  for  demanding  more  democracy,  pushing  harder  in  favour  of  market-
oriented reforms, and supporting the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. This is a similar 
case with “counter revolutionaries” in the FSU and China, but his writings were 
neither banned nor implemented.  
 
Since its introduction in the early 1950s, the system of market socialism remained 
essentially  unchanged  till  the  initiation  of  market  economy  reforms  in  the  late 
1980s,  although  it  underwent  four  important  changes.  The  main  institutional 
changes and phases of the development of Yugoslav self-management were: (i) 
the period of centrally planned economy (1945-52) that was similar to the Soviet 
model of socialism; (ii) the introduction of self-management (1952-65), where the 
process of decision-making  was  gradually  decentralised;  (iii) the period of  self-
managed market socialism (1965-1974) when market mechanisms were utilised in 
as many areas as possible, focusing on the activities of the SOEs operating in the 
market; and (iv) the system of „free associated labour‟ (1974-1988), or „contractual 
socialism‟ (Estrin and Petrin, 1991). 
 
Like many communist countries, Yugoslavia did not have any theory of transition 
when the time of giving up its market socialism to (full)market economy came. One 
attempt to generate and establish theories of transformation and transition of this 
economic system failed or remained just where it started. Since market socialism 
was already market oriented, and leaving aside the political disorganisation and 
disintegration  of  the  SFRY  during  the  1990s,  the  question  is:  can  this  be 
considered  transition,  transformation,  or  evolution  of  the  system  depending  on 
historical stages? To many citizens in the former SFRY, the sudden collapse of 
self-management socialism did not come from economic causes as it did from the 
civil  wars  and  disintegration  of  the  country.  The  question  on  the  lack  of  a 
consensus whether economic transformations are planned and organised or they 
happen in a spontaneous way, and what the impact of externalities in making them 
so (organised or spontaneous), was raised by Seliger (2002). He, among others, 
challenges the view and questions if economic transformations in CEE that often   10 
are used synonymous with transition, should be called as such or evolutions. In 
case  of  transformation,  the  starting  point  A  and  ending  point  B  is  known, 
sometimes in approximately timely manner, whereas in transition the end point is 
hard  to  be  determined.    This  claim  is  relevant  to  former  communist  countries 
whose point A or beginning of transition is known, but there is no a consensus as 
when the point B is or can be reached, or is this transition or evolution? It is known 
that that there is a light in the tunnel or pint B. However, how long it will take, with 
what costs and challenges to get there, has been a difficult task to anticipate or 
measure than expected. This  is because transformation cannot be seen as an 
isolated experiment; its meaning is broader involving many society sectors and 
institutional development. Likewise, self-management socialism evolved during its 
lifetime. Uvalic (1992) argues that whatever changes it might have undergone, the 
system could not be associated with transformation until one party political system 
and social ownership were given up. It also did not mean that emergence of a 
multi-party system and the privatisation of social ownership were transformations 
because both politics and the economy had to evolve. Such an ambiguity between 
evolution,  transition  and  transformation  brings  us  back  to  the  discussion  of 
theories  on  convergence  of  economic  models  developed  by  Tinbergen  (1961), 
from which can be learned a lesson how to restrain transition from spontaneity and 
increase the role of the state in the economy but with a different approach than in 
the previous system.  
 
2.  Social  market  economy  and  self-management  socialism  concepts 
compared 
 
The  concept  of  SMEC  originated  in  West  Germany  (then  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany) from where it has taken the name as Soziale Marktwirtschaft in German 
language.  Germany‟s  post  WWII  reconstruction  and  leading  economic 
development  in  Europe  –  the  Wirtschaftswunder  (the  economic  miracle)  –  is 
attributed to this model. It is a model in which the state plays active role through 
redistribution of incomes and in the labour market in trying to control rent-seeking 
activities and behaviour of interests groups who might exploit others. The model is   11 
compulsory enforced by constitution – operated by the government in a market 
economy (Whitt, 2002). A similar or the same model had been introduced by and 
is  popular  in  two  other  German  speaking  countries  (Austria  and  Switzerland), 
Western and Northern Europe. The popularity has made it to see some of its forms 
included  in  the  European  Union  (EU)  Constitution  to  nearly  become  the  EU‟s 
standard economic model. Joerges and Rödl (2004) called it the “Europe‟s Social 
Model”.  
 
The  emergence  of  recent financial  crisis  in  Anglo-American  model of  a  market 
economy  may  suggest  that  Markwirtschaft  is  a  better  economic  model  or  an 
alternative to it. This view is not shared Seliger and Wrobel (2007) who argue that 
this Ordnunspolitik (economic order policy) of the SMEC is in serious crisis and 
perhaps needs to be substantially reformed to lower the burden of welfare states 
in  favour  of  making  business  more  competitive.
7  Clapham (2007) on the other 
hand, could not support the claim of Joerges and Rodl for EU‟s standard economic 
model,  because,  that  is  to  depend  largely  on  EU  member  states  how  they 
institutionalise,  finance  and  reform  their  own  social  security  systems.  Then  a 
possible  convergence  between  them  can  be  considered,  included  in  the  EU‟s 
Constitution to be called the “Europe‟s Social Model”. Such an attitude on SMEC is 
a historical reminder and lesson that was missing in terms of the lack of theories 
on transition from communism to a market economy – that alternative views and 
theories  should  be  in  place  despite  that  the  existing  system  is  working  well 
compared  to  others.  The  theories,  which  do  not  necessarily  imply  to  be 
implemented immediately in the present system, at least should exist as theories, 
so the countries may have a roadmap upon unexpected systemic changes and do 
                                                 
7 In regard to this reference and relevant to the countries under consideration in this paper, Germany’s social 
welfare burden for nearly two last decades has included a large number of asylum seekers and refugees from 
the former SFRY and her sucessor states. Based on the discussion of the Author of this paper with a number 
of refugees and asylums during the 1990s in Germany, many of them preferred to receive social assistance 
than get a job, because, as they stated, “once you get the job you have to pay a lot of taxes and contributions, 
thus  at  the  end  of  the  day  you  find  how  costly  is  to  be  employed  compared  to  being  unemployed  but 
receiving social assistance”. While this is true for the amount of money the persons received from social 
scheme, being employed has many benefits: first, it facilitates social burden of the government; second; the 
employed contribute to the state budget; and third, taking a job means getting work experience which may be 
used in the labour market for future employment.    12 
not face economic downturns like transition countries did in the 1990s where, lack 
of theories on transition was very much blamed for that cause.  
 
SMEC is a very broad concept and model as it was socialist economic system. For 
the relevance of this Paper, only basic concepts will be discussed and compared 
between SMEC and self-management socialism. Some of the basic pillars of the 
first (SMEC), are (Esderts, 2003; Hase et al., 2008):  
  A  constitutional  economic  model.  The  state  outlines  and  the  concept  of 
SMEC and makes it compulsory.     
  Active role of the state in a market economy. The state is the regulator of 
economic order to make sure that rules of the game are obeyed, and it 
protects the players from discrimination or rent-seeking behaviour; 
  Economic  planning  at  national  level.  Almost  no  planning  except  some 
development  strategies  and  government  policies  just  to  give  some 
orientation on development; 
  The principle of free choices and competition. All economic activities are 
organised in the market on supply and demand basis which determine the 
price  of  products  and  services.  The  market  signals  what  products  and 
services should be offered; 
  In relation to previous pillar, free entry and exit for the firms is guaranteed. 
The state only plays the role or intervenes in cases where there are market 
failures; 
  International trade.  Companies are allowed to import and export whatever 
goods in unlimited quantities pursuant to the regulations of the state. They 
are  also  free  to  enter  into  business  agreements  with  other  companies 
throughout the world, transfer their capital abroad and allow foreigners to 
buy their property at home; 
  Decision makings at micro level. Employers do not exploit the workers or 
forcing them to work long hours and whatever the employer wants, except 
those works and working hours envisaged by the rule of law. Enterprises   13 
are run by the managers but the workers are entitled to establish the works’ 
council and have their say in company‟s affairs and decision makings;  
  Property  rights.  The  model  is  based  on  private  property  which  is 
guaranteed and not restrictions to its size of possession apply. Privatisation 
of  public  companies  comes  into  consideration  only  when  competition  is 
secured in order to avoid monopolies and price discriminations;   
  Income  distribution.  The  state  plays  and  indirect  role  in  distribution  or 
redistributes incomes through taxes it collects from businesses to the rest 
of population. To make this policy work efficiently, SMEC imposes more 
and  higher taxes  than,  let  us  say  new  liberal  economy  who  place more 
emphasis on efficiency of business with lower taxes but generating sharp 
differences in income inequality;   
  Health  insurance.  A  large  proportion  of  German  population  belongs  to 
Health  Insurance  Scheme,  whereas  employees  and  workers  should  be 
members and pay for it from monthly earnings; 
  Housing policy. Privately owned with the market for housing. Transactions 
(buying and selling) allowed. Credits from the banks for apartments and 
houses;  
  Education and research policy. Providing equal opportunities for education 
and research for all through scholarships and foundations. Educated and 
trained  people  are free  to  compete  with  their  skills in  the  labour market 
regardless who might have financed their studies.    
 
The history of self-management socialism is already discussed in section one of 
this paper. Its major pillars upon which it operated were (Jugoslovenski Pregled, 
1990): 
  A constitutional economic model. The 1974 Constitution of the former SFRY 
contains around 55 pages to regulate the self-management, Chapter I  - 
The  Socio-Economic  System  (pages  30-65)  and  Chapter  II  –  The 
Foundations of the Socio-Political System (pages 65-84);   14 
  The state played active role in the economy. The state was in charge to 
control  rent-seeking  behaviour  of  managers  and  employees  in  socially-
owned enterprises, but did not order enterprises what to produce, how and 
for whom;  
  Indicative or bottom-up planning. Planning was not condition sine qua non 
like in centralist socialism. Plans were mandatory at enterprise level which 
enterprises prepared for themselves. The state then prepared an overall 
planning or strategy for development of the country and harmonised it with 
the plans of municipalities and federal units; 
  Market  and  competition.  There  was  a  market  and  competition  in  self-
management, but only within the country, thus making many companies in 
monopoly and oligopoly position.  
  Very limited entries and exit. Bankruptcies very rarely applied. Most entries 
came from existing enterprises; 
  International  trade.  Protectionism  applied.  Companies  could  carry  works 
and do business in foreign countries. Abundance (surplus) of products at 
home was encouraged for export; export of other goods that did not meet 
the demand at home was restricted or prohibited to avoid shortages. For 
goods that it did not have the capacities to produce at a needed quantity 
and  quality  to  the  market  requirements,  it  allowed  imports  to  avoid 
shortages; 
  Decision makings at micro level.  In theory, the workers’ council was the 
central management organ in companies of the self-management socialism. 
This organ was in charge of almost everything starting from, election of the 
workers‟  representatives  in  the  management  board,  to  election  and 
dismissal of the director general of the company by votes in the general 
assembly of the workers; 
  Property  rights.  Social  ownership.  Enterprises  were  socially-owned  and 
managed by the workers. The workers could use socially-owned assets to 
enhance the value of the enterprises and increase their own salaries and   15 
welfare depending on the success or performance of business activity, but 
were prohibited to sell socially-owned assets; 
  Income distribution. The workers were supposed to make the decision on 
the level of their incomes, i.e. they decided how higher their own salaries 
should be. Given this incentive, the state imposed restrictions to invest a 
proportion  of  the  company‟s  profit,  because  the  workers  would  always 
prefer to distribute that profit on their account as salaries or incomes rather 
than invest; 
  Health insurance and medical care. This sector was state-owned and free 
not  only  to  the  workers,  but  also  to  the  citizens.  Companies  paid 
contributions  for  health  insurance.  The  workers  and  the  citizens  were 
required to register with health institutions; 
  Housing policy. All block of apartments in which employees of economic 
sectors  resided,  were  in  social  ownership.  They  were  mostly  build  or 
contracted by socially-owned enterprises (SOEs) which allocated funds for 
such  purposes.  Other  apartments  in  which  employees  of  non-economic 
resided  (e.g.  doctors,  teachers,  sportsmen,  actors,  journalists)  were  also 
socially-owned. The residents could partially or wholly rent their apartments 
to others and generate incomes, but were prohibited to sell them; 
  Education  and  research  policy.  Education  was  free.  For  graduate  and 
postgraduate education, the state provided funding opportunities for those 
who could not afford costs and had prerequisites to obtain skills.     
 
Before jumping to the forthcoming sub-section where the concepts of SMEC and 
self-management will be rejoined to find their convergences and divergences, it is 
important to note some aspects of self-management in practice. The system in 
essence meant that the workers were supposed, and they truly felt, to be the only 
rulers  of  SOEs.  And  they  were  not  always  the  rulers;  the  LCY  which  was 
decentralised  into  eight  LCYs  (one  per  republic  and/or  autonomous  province) 
exercised a significant role and active interference in the business of SOEs, mainly 
through managers or directors general.    16 
The first SOEs were established on the basis of confiscation and nationalisation of 
private property after WWII. This process was enforced by the adoption the Law 
on  Confiscation  of  the  Property  of  Enemies  and  their  Collaborators  (Knežević, 
1975).  These  groups  of  enterprises  constituted  the  material  basis  of  centralist 
socialism  in  Yugoslavia.  With  the  introduction  of  self-management,  state 
ownership of the bulk of enterprises was transformed to social ownership in the 
first  phase  of  decentralisation  in  the  early  1950s.  The  second  method  of 
establishing SOEs was provided through new entries or firms mostly established 
by: (i) local government (ii) central government; (iii) groups of workers; (iv) existing 
SOEs. The most common form of entry was through existing firms. Normally, the 
parent  firm  first  established  a  daughter  firm  with  identical  or  related  activities 
(Vanek,  1970).  Another  method  of  establishing  a  new  firm  was  by  a  group  of 
citizens,  and  self-managed  community  of  interest  (SMCI).
8  Bankruptcy  in 
Yugoslavia could come into effect only when some adjustment in the national 
demand  was  necessary.  In  reality,  SOEs  were  almost  never  allowed  to  go 
bankrupt. State subsidies or arrangement by other organisations rescued firms in 
financial difficulties. In case of bankruptcy, assets were sold and the proceeds 
from the sale went to the account of the persons or institutions that established the 
enterprise in the first place.   
 
2.1 Common and divergent points between self-management, social market 
economy and other systems 
 
Many readers would question the existence of this part of the paper given the 
discussion in previous section. The purpose here is not only to find what SMEC 
and  self-management  have  in  common  or  in  contrast,  but  to  bring  additional 
evidence in a matrix of comparison the features of other economic model such as 
centralist socialism, new liberal or Anglo-American model, and concepts from a 
                                                 
8 SMCIs were formed by working people or their self-managing organisations and communities, to satisfy the 
workers’ personal and common needs and interests. The  workers paid contributions  from their personal 
incomes and from incomes of Organisations of Associated Labour (OAL) to raise funds of SMCIs. Such 
funds could be used to satisfy the following needs: education, science, culture, health, social security and 
pension,  social  welfare,  housing,  transport,  and  collective  consumption  (Articles  51-55  of  the  1974 
Constitution of former Yugoslavia).    17 
diversified experience transition economies by referring to those phenomena that 
more  acceptable  as  general,  namely  from  successor  states  of  the  former 
Yugoslavia. In the Table below, the first column lists economic categories. The 
rows  indicate  their  description  or  meaning  in  different  in  different  economic 
models. The columns for SMEC and self-management are market with italic bold 
as these two are the focus in this paper. Signs that appear in the last column are 
explained  underneath  the  Table.  Most  categories  compared  are  either  partially 
convergent or divergent. Few others are convergent and divergent, including those 
that  were/are  unique,  e.g.  the  Workers’  Council  in  self-management  and  the 
Works’  Council  in  SMEC  are  classified  as  partially  divergent.  A  similar  case 
applies when classifying the status of market and competition which appears to be 
close  to  each  other  in  operation  but  have  differences.  The  market  in  self-
management was characterised by some inefficiencies as a result of controlled 
demand,  less  product  differentiation,  and  little  competition  from  outside.  While 
under capitalism and SMEC the market signals to producers which goods should 
be  produced,  under  self-management  producers  determined  what  products 
consumers  could  buy.  In  spite  of  allowing  greater  size  and  scope  of  private 
property, the essence of self-management is in social property – a unique regime 
of  property  rights.  Because  social  ownership  is  very  different  from  dominant 
private ownership in capitalist, the status of self-management socialism vs. SMEC 
is wholly divergent.      18 
Table 1: Matrix of economic categories and their description in different economic models 














   
Planning at 
national level 
Mandatory.  From 




No planning. Governments’ 
development strategies and 
policies 
Indicative or Governments’ 









State owned  Socially owned 
Small size of private 
property. 90% of 
agricultural land in 
private ownership  










Small private businesses 
allowed. Up to 10 
employees and 15 (later 
30) hectares of land in 
private possession 
No restrictions  No restrictions. Tendencies 
for monopolies controlled 
No restrictions   
Publicly-owned 
companies 
Managed by the 
state authorities 
Managed by municipal 
authorities (with few 
exceptions for 
companies of strategic 
interest for the state). 
The Workers’ Council is 
in place but with lesser 
power than in SOEs 
Managed by municipal 
authorities. Privatisation.   
Managed by municipal 
authorities. Partial or limited 
privatisation/management 
contracts. Works’ Council 
Managed by municipal 
or political authorities. 






None. Supply and 
demand, entry and 
exit rare and fully 
controlled and 
regulated by the 
state 
Largely free. Supply and 
demand regulated. Entry 
and exit of firms free but 
very rare in practice 
Free. Competition in the 
market determines supply and 
demand, entry and exit 
Free. Competition in the 
market determines supply 
and demand, entry and exit. 
The Government corrects 
market failures 
Free. Market failures 
frequent. Limited role 





Fully controlled by 
the state.  
Partially liberal. Import 
and export quotas for 
shortages and surplus 
apply. YUS standards 
Liberal. No restrictions on 
import and export.  
Liberal. No restrictions on 
import and export. However, 
products must meet the EU 
standards  
Liberal and with no 
restrictions, but a lot of 
smuggling and unfair 
competition   
 
Decision  Director elected by  The Workers’ Council  Director/Chief Executive or  Director/Chief Executive or  Director/Chief     19 







as a central decision 
making organ. Director 
general accountable to 
the Workers’ Council 
owner. Management of the 
company. Director 
accountable to management 
board 
owner. Management of the 
company. Director 
accountable to management 
board 
Executive or owner. 




Consumer goods  Imports restricted. 
Frequent shortages.  
Shortages avoided 
through importing of 
goods  
Abundance of consumer 
goods. Money not available 
for all consumers of various 
goods due to sharp differences 
in incomes 
Abundance of consumer 
goods. Availability of money 
more spread to the 
population as a result of 
Governments’ redistribution 
of incomes through social 
policies 
No shortages of goods 
but shortage of money 










budget constraints - 
subsidies  
Promoting and 
maximising the workers’ 
welfare. Inefficient 
penalties for workers’ 
misconduct (their 
Assembly and Council 
can dismiss the 
management). Soft 
budget constraints - 
subsidies 
Profit maximisation. Strong 
working discipline and 
efficient penalties. Hard 
budget constraints and 
permanent threat of 
bankruptcy.   
Profit maximisation and 
welfare of employees. Strong 
working discipline with 
penalties for misconduct in 
place. Hard budget 




in initial and 
intermediate transition 
phase due to high 
unemployment and 
large share of informal 





Determined by the 
state or its 
agents/management 
of the companies 
The workers are biased 
to increase their salaries 
as the company 
increases profit. 
Restrictions by the 
Government on the use 
of profit. Welfare of the 
workers.   
The 
owner/entrepreneur/managem
ent decides about allocation of 
the profit. Workers’ salaries 
determined by the 
management or the labour 
market. Lower taxes for 
businesses – corporations  
Workers’ salaries determined 
by the company or the labour 
market depending on his/her 
skills. Higher taxes for 
corporations – may make 
them less competitive. The 
Governments’ policy for 
redistribution of incomes 
Lower salaries for the 
workers as a result of 
limited labour mobility 
and unemployment. 
Lower taxation for 








Residents do not 
have the right to 
sell them.  
Socially-owned. The 
right to use and generate 
incomes from renting. 









disputes more common 





 Partially convergent or closer to divergence 
 Partially divergent or closer to convergence  20 
3.  Development  disparities  in  self-management  socialism  and  during 
transition to a market economy   
 
The greatest challenge of the self-management which it faced from the beginning, 
was to reduce regional disparities in economic development inherited after WWII. 
Narrowing  the  gap  between  developed  regions  (DRs,  Slovenia,  Croatia,  and 
Vojvodina) and less developed regions (LDRs, Bosnia and Herzegovina  – BiH, 
FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo), a similar approach used by SMEC, 
became a top priority for both ideological and political reasons.
9 Referring to the 
Gini coefficient as a measure of income inequality for the period 1953-1965 when 
it was 0.25, self-management seems to have been in line with centrally planned 
economies. During that period, the system recorded the fastest economic growth 
in  the  world  measured  by  output,  combined  labour  productivity  and  ris ing 
employment (Horvat,  op.  cit,  1982).
10  The labour productivity as a whole had 
hidden many qualities and deficiencies at micro level. There were workers in 
SOEs working harder on one hand, and lazier or far less productive ones on the 
other hand who received equal salaries. Standards of productivity measurement 
for awards and/or reprobation, did not apply efficiently and this had contributed to 
erosion of the working discipline (Mulaj, 2007).  
 
The  role  of  reducing  the  gap  in  development  was  played  by  the  General 
Investment  Fund  (until  1963  when  it  was  abolished),  which  followed  the 
                                                 
9 Reducing the inherited gap in development between DRs and LDRs was a challenge and priority because of 
multinational  composition  of  the  country  where  no  nationality  was  dominant.  Territorial  division  of  the 
federal units was also not clearly arranged on national basis. For example, Serbs were the largest ethnic 
group who, apart from Serbia, lived in a considerable number in BiH and Croatia. Croats followed after 
Serbs, where a large minority of Croatians lived in BiH and Vojvodina. Bosnians or Muslims, the largest 
ethnic group of BiH were also found in the region of Sandzak, in Serbia. As by the end of 1980s, the only 
units with the highest share of indigenous population were Slovenians in Slovenia and Albanians in Kosovo. 
Albanians also lived in FYR Macedonia comprising around ¼ of total population.  
10 The Croatian economist Branko Horvat after his study  (book) “The Political Economy of  Socialism” 
published in 1982 in English, was nominated by the American Society of Economists for the Nobel Prize for 
economy. The book is translated into Chinese in 2001 or two years before Horvat passed away. A kind of 
self-management and market socialism is still present in China. China’s township village enterprises have 
many self-management rights like SOEs had in the former SFRY. Economic growth in China is the fastest in 
the world for almost three decades in a row, getting out an estimated 400 million people of poverty (i.e. like 
the total population of Germany, Britain and France combined), but this model is not subject of discussion in 
this paper.    21 
establishment of the Federal Fund for Crediting Economic Development of LDRs.  
The Fund gave favourable credits for investments and resources for development 
to LDRs. It also acted as a centre of coordination and cooperation between DRs 
and the LDRs. The policy of regional development and use of the Fund faced 
challenges  between  centralised  and  decentralised  approach.
11  Regional 
development policy achieved a partial success by nar rowing the gap somewhere 
and increasing it elsewhere. Pleština‟s (1992) work and reference to official federal 
statistics of SFRY notes a gap of incomes per capita between the most developed 
Slovenia and the least developed Kosovo as 1:4 in 1953 and 1:8 in 1990. The 
figures of World Bank (1991) presented in Appendix to this paper for the same 
comparison in 1990 indicates a ratio of around 1:4, which may suggest that the 
gap in incomes per capita between Slovenia and Kosovo actually narrowed. The 
widening of this and other gaps during transition to most recent years, is worth 
commenting after a reference to some studies on the issue, in which a number of 
successor states of the former SFRY were included in analyses. The studies are 
only indicative given the unreliable data in transition economics, difficulties and 
standards of measurement.  
 
Milanovic (1995) finds that a growing income inequality has increased the number 
of population living in poverty. The causes of earnings inequality were identified or 
attributed to skilled workers such as professionals who were more able to adopt 
their skills to the labour market requirements. Incomes of middle class with skills 
from socialist system had generally declined. Ruminska-Zimny (1997) thinks that 
to  this  change  it  has  come  as  a  result  of  not  only  deterioration  in  economic 
performance, but also because the nomenklatura was in a better starting point to 
utilise opportunities at the expense of the population. The nomenklatura already 
had an endowment of wealth, and as the process of transition evolved, it gave rise 
to  further  income  differences  and  deepening  of  poverty.  Transition  countries 
                                                 
11  DRs  supported  decentralisation  clearly  to  benefit  their  interests.  Serbia  being  at  an  average  level  of 
development in the  federation supported centralisation, something  which Slovenia and Croatia saw as a 
tendency of Serbian domination. LDRs for their benefits should have supported centralisation, but except 
Montenegro which on average was benefiting more from the Fund, BIH, Macedonia, and Kosova did not 
prefer centralisation because of the fear of Serbian domination from which they had suffered in the past 
(Lydall, 1984).    22 
suffering from ethnic conflicts and civil wars like in the former Yugoslavia, where 
the  governments  had  the  power  centralised  which  directed  and  used  many 
resources  to  finance  the  war  expenditures.  Apart  from  causing  economic 
performance, the shift or allocation considerable resources for war contributed to 
the rise of income differences by making few at the top rich even in a criminal way 
(Wolf, 1999).  
 
Forbes  (2000) finds  a  positive  relationship of  income  inequality  on  growth  in a 
sample  of  45  countries  of  world  using  a  panel  data  set  from  1966-1995.  The 
findings for the sample as whole could not contradict earlier studies on negative 
impact of income inequality on economic growth. Barro (2000) for instance, did not 
find any significant relationship between inequality and growth when he used three 
stage least squares (3SLS) with random effects for the whole sample. But when 
he looked at across sub-samples, the impact on growth relationship was found 
negative  for poor and  positive  for rich  countries.  The  results of Yeon  Kim  and 
Pirttila  (2006)  study  using  the  data  from  transition  economies,  suggested  that 
public support for reforms is negatively correlated with growing income inequality 
which further acts as a political constraint to the reform progress. A more recent 
study by Sukiassyan (2007) for transition economies, is in line with majority of 
earlier studies on the issue when it indicates a strong negative impact of rising 
income inequality on economic growth.  
 
Unfortunately, an indicator of crucial importance – poverty level, is not available for 
comparative  discussion  even  for  different  interrupted  or  certain  periods,  e.g.  a 
given year in the late period of socialism, then two or three years during transition 
until recently. Poverty in socialism was hidden and kept confidential. Measuring 
poverty level in transition economies, in particular the former SFRY region, is a 
serious challenge, figures unreliable and interpretation difficult due to scarcity and 
low quality of the data. In addition, there are methodological problems about the 
real poverty line where, different poverty lines are used.  Another problem is that, 
even existing measures are not annual but for a certain year in time period which 
often differs by country. This makes comparisons less relevant for the countries   23 
we  have  under  consideration,  and  even  less  relevant  as  disintegration  of 
Yugoslavia continued over the last two decades until 2008 when Kosovo became 
an independent state. In any case, apart from Slovenia as a member of the EU, 
poverty  remains  widespread  and  multidimensional  among  many  categories  of 
people. Poverty in rural areas increased sharply as a consequence of civil wars 
and flow of the people to the cities in search of better life. Sarajevo, Belgrade, 
Zagreb, Pristina are capitals to have been overpopulated after the civil wars by 
newcomers  from  rural  areas  where  they  have  been  largely  depending  on 
subsistence agriculture.  
 
The figures presented in Appendix may provide a clue about general picture of the 
SFRY,  now  comprised  of  seven  successor  independent  states.  The  figures 
suggest that total population of this region has shrunk by 1 million from 1990 to 
2007 as a result of civil wars and migration. Development disparities in terms of 
incomes per capita and unemployment rate appear to have substantially widened 
over time. As of 2007, Slovenia‟s GDP per capita was 11.4 times higher than of 
Kosovo, or Kosovo‟s GDP per capita accounted for only around 8 percent to that 
of  Slovenia.  Except  Slovenia  and  Croatia,  the  rest  of  the  countries  with  lower 
levels of GDP per capita have also a double digit unemployment rate ranging from 
over 18 percent  in  Serbia  to a more  recent  estimate  of  45  percent  in  Kosovo. 
Income  inequalities  or  Gini  Coefficient  within  the  countries  increased.  In  FYR 
Macedonia this figure was recorded as being the same in 1989 and in 2002, at 
0.27. For the rest, it increased to over 0.30. The rise in income inequalities, in 
addition to the causes mentioned earlier in this section that were more or less in 
common for many countries, arose in the privatisation process of social ownership 
involving rent seeking behaviour. The process of mass privatisation was heavily 
criticised for not involving broad citizens‟ participation, being non-transparent and 
selective  from  which  a  small  group,  mostly  supporters  of  the  party  in  power 
(Croatian Democratic Union - HDZ) led by Franjo Tudjman, benefited (Franičević, 
1999). A similar case of unfair benefits by the political party in power happened in 
Serbia under Milošević‟s Socialist Party of Serbia - SPS (Palairet, 2001). This may 
only  one  of  the  many  other  reasons  why  Gini  Coefficient  for  Slovenia  in  2002   24 
stood at 0.30 whereas in Croatia at 0.35 and Serbia at 0.37. Perhaps naturally, the 
democratic  votes  brought  to  power  social  democrats  in  Croatia,  and  later 
democrats in Serbia. A similar rotation or revision of economic policies occurred in 
Albania in 1997 with the return of socialists into power after collapse of pyramid 
schemes  following  by  severe  social  unrest  with  1,500  deaths  and  widespread 
destruction of property. The case or lesson o Slovenia is completely different in 
this  respect.  The  long  serving  communist  leaders  Milan  Kučan  and  Janez 
Drnovšek  were  in  top  positions  as  Prime  Minster  and  President  of  Slovenia 
throughout  the  transition  or  one  and  a  half  decade.  To  sum  this  section  up, 
countries with more income inequalities and rent seeking behaviour tend to be 
politically and economically less stable.  
 
4. What economic model and system for the former SFRY countries? 
 
Although  the  Anglo-American  version  of  a  market  economy  known  as  new 
liberalism operating since the 1980s was praised for efficiency but now has come 
to  the  question  of  revision  following  the  Democratic  Party  wining  of  the White 
House,  its  efficiency  was  mixed  even  before.  For  instance,  Clinton‟s  years  of 
economic management and policies that were more socially oriented, were more 
efficient than Reagan‟s policies of more limited interventionism, lower taxes and 
deregulation. In Britain too, large scale privatisation by the Thatcher government of 
public companies had pushed unemployment at 11 percent by 1986 and doubled 
the poverty (Florio, 2004). In spite of some success, the reputation of Thatcher‟s 
successor John Major and his cabinet was generally disregarded for economic 
competence after the Black Wednesday in 1992. Britain has slipped to 21st in the 
world prosperity league – another fine mess, was the famous slogan of Labour 
Party before taking power in 1997 to end the 18 years of consecutive Conservative 
government. In Germany or the pioneer of Sozialen Markwirtschaft, the economy 
was in a mild recession since the introduction of Euro as a currency. Currently, the 
SMEC  in  its  birthplace  country  is  in  serious  crisis  and  under  discussion  to  be 
significantly,  if  not  substantially,  reformed.  Notwithstanding  the  current  crisis, 
shortcomings as well as the past of SMEC that brought the Wirtschaftswunder, or   25 
prospects  of  other  economic  models,  the  question  in  this  section  is:  what 
economic  model  and  system  should  the  successor  states  of  the  former  SFRY 
have?  The  rest  of  the  section  excludes  Slovenia  as  an  EU  country  that  has 
reached  a  higher level of  development,  stability  and  social  welfare  against  her 
counterparts with which once was part of Yugoslavia. 
 
The  countries  concerned  already  have  their  economic  model(s)  in  place  and 
operational. That is the market economy model but still in transition or like the 
early  capitalist  development  in Western  countries.  Based  on  the  problems  and 
deficiencies presented so far, the governments should undertake serious steps, be 
deeply committed and allocate resources for reforms to make a progress towards 
a more comprehensive SMEC model. A number of causes described an discussed 
up  to  this  section,  justify  the  recommendation;  widespread  poverty,  high 
unemployment  rate,  rent  seeking  behaviour,  rising  income  differences,  risk  of 
social tensions, and so on. The problem is not so much to the resources available 
to achieve this objective; the problem is to the behaviour of the governments and 
political  establishments.  Therefore,  their  behaviour  should  change  first,  so  the 
population and electoral votes do not need, because of unhappiness, to put into 
and down from the power different elites frequently except those elites that are 
more committed for general welfare.      
 
One approach to reform the current transition model into SMEC is to learn from 
the  experience  and  accumulated  knowledge  of  the Western  Europe,  especially 
Germany from where this model originated and has longer tradition. Since copying 
the  model  is  not  known  what  effects  would  produce  due  to  different  historical 
stages of development (like the Washington Consensus for transition countries), 
the experience of Eastern Germany might be useful as a former socialist country. 
Yet  the  lesson  from  this  experience  has  considerable  limitations  as  it  was  an 
institutional transplantation with massive resource allocation from West Germany. 
Successor states of the former SFRY are not in a position or lucky to receive that 
huge aid and support. The funds of many international organisations and the EU 
regardless how helpful might be, again may not be sufficient. An early study by   26 
Sen  (1981)  has  indicated  that  many  aid  programmes  through  development 
agencies  and  UN  organisations  were  not  successful  to  prevent  widespread 
famines,  hunger,  starvation  and  deaths  of  millions  of  people  world  wide.  The 
greatest  effort,  commitment  and  determination  should  come  from  inside  or  the 
countries themselves first. Perhaps a better lesson for a SMEC can be learned 
from  the  country  which  once  was  part  of  the  SFRY  and  now  EU  member  – 
Slovenia.   
 
It should be noted that the concept and model of SMEC is popular and acceptable 
to majority if not to all in the Western Balkans. However, the determination and 
economic conditions in practice suggest that the model is far away from being 
standard.  The  governments  may  play  a  more  active  role  by  redistribution  of 
incomes in favour of implementing social policies to provide a better welfare state. 
Redistribution effects by taking away a share of resources successful or powerful 
people (capitalists) in a form of higher taxes and allocate them for social policies to 
the poor for empowerment, may make businesses less competitive and constrain 
economic  growth  in  the  short  run.  But  it  is  better  that  the  state  does  so.  The 
capitalists in transition economies do not have any incentive to employ additional 
workers if that does not result in maximisation of profit. If they do allocate or raise 
funds for humanitarian aid, that is more to enhance their prestige as individuals or 
group on behalf of aid at home and international level.  
 
Promotion,  implementation  and  strengthening  of  social  policies  should  be 
intensified, because, these are the countries coming out of the Yugoslav war as 
did Western Europe. Economic consolidation and sustainable development with 
the exception of Croatia, have not proven so successful with current economic 
model.  The  rest  of  the  region  remains  vulnerable  to  social  tensions  where, 
underdevelopment is one of the main causes with the risk, as Marx put it, of class 
struggles  and  internal  contradictions.  Only  the  way  to  faster  economic 
development  and  better  welfare  for  the  citizens  may  make  the  people  more 
tolerant against social tensions and SMEC is an alternative. SMEC is also a model 
for majority of the EU countries or the union in which the countries of the Western   27 
Balkans not aspire to join as soon as they can. To get to the EU membership 
faster and more prepared, social policies should be reformed. Some policies in 
place and underway to be reformed are not in compliance with the rhetoric for 
becoming more SMEC. For example, the Government of Kosovo has approved 
changes  in  taxation  policy  that  are due  to enter into force from January  2009, 
according  to  which:  Corporate  Income  Tax  (CIT)  rate  is  halved  from  20  to  10 
percent,  Value  Added  Tax  (VAT)  is  increased  from  15  to  16  percent.  The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2008) had warned the Government in advance 
not to go below the rate of 15 percent for CIT fearing this may endanger the state‟s 
budget stability as Kosovo has a limited taxation base or less number of taxes 
than the neighbouring countries. The Government wrongly reported and the media 
wrongly broadcasted that VAT is to increase by 1 percent. An increase from 15 to 
16  percent  is  precisely  an  increase  by  6.7  percent.  Furthermore,  what  the 
Government is trying to do by this scheme, is simple; to make the few richer, and 
the  majority  of  population  (45  percent  lives  in  poverty  and  another  percentage 
close  to  this  is  unemployed)  even  poorer,  plus,  eventually  bringing  additional 
people into poverty line (VAT is mostly a tax on everyday consumption of food and 
related  items)  by  increasing  their  cost  by  6.7  percent  (Mulaj,  2008).  Still  with 
Kosovo (because this is being presented a very unique case in the world), after 
approving the changes in taxation scheme, the Government made a great publicity 
in  the  media  when  it  signed  the  memorandum  with  the  United  Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) to reach the Millennium Goals. Two of eight 
Millennium Goals are: i) halve the proportion of people living in poverty line by 
2015; and ii) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases. In the first Goal, the 
Government is in the opposite track. And so is in the second Goal (UNDP‟s sixth 
Goal), in which one of the Goal‟s objective says: “[to] save halted by 2015 and 
begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS”. Here too, the Government is on the 
wrong  track  with  the  Constitution  containing  controversial  provisions  against 
human dignity and family.
12 Obviously, the case of Kosovo is indeed very specific, 
                                                 
12 http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf. The author 
of this Paper has been involved with representatives of 50 NGO’s from the United States and Europe in 
advising the Government about controversial provisions that the Draft Constitution had, which was prepared   28 
but it a reminder and lesson for fragile democracies in underdeveloped countries 
in  this  region  of  the  Balkans  that,  socially  oriented  reforms  may  not  work  or 
produce  expected  results  as  long  as  there  are  more  demagogy  than  concrete 
actions in economic development and welfare of the states. And this is what has 
been and is often featuring political elites in most successor states of the former 
SFRY, especially those with high unemployment rate and poverty level.   
 
5. Conclusions and further discussion 
 
When socialism collapsed and transition to a market economy begun, in its first 
years, delivered many disappointed results. Lack of sound and elaborated theories 
on economic (also political) transition has long been blamed in the literature of 
transition economics as one of the main causes leading to unexpected surprises. 
Criticism against capitalism could have been in place by many when transition 
emerged. People in general somehow had to agree for the way ahead because 
there was no alternative or the way back. This Paper did not attempt to discover 
something new by discussing historical evidence that led to the outspoken lack of 
theories on transition from socialism to a market economy; the point was to learn a 
lesson for generating theories for the present and possible anticipated economic 
                                                                                                                                                    
by  some  foreigners  from  A  to  Z.  The  Government  refused  to  make  amendments  and  approved  the 
Constitution subsequently by acclamation in Kosovo’s Parliament. Some of controversial provisions, now in 
force, are: Article 24.2 disallows discrimination based on sexual orientation. This clause will be used to 
promote homosexual marriage in Kosovo; Articles 25 and 26 legalise abortion; Article 37 does not recognise 
natural family as there is no reference to marriage between men and women. Article 72.1 uses the term 
“gender” which is a grammatical case (masculine, feminine and neutral) and rejects or does not refer to “sex” 
(male and female or man and woman). Before all these, Article 19.2 puts all international norms above every 
law in Kosovo.  It continues in Article 20.1 to state that “The Republic of Kosovo may on the basis of ratified 
international agreements delegate state powers for specific matters to international organizations”. Once this 
is done (delegation of power), immediately in Article 20.2 “…those norms [of international organisations] 
have superiority over the laws of the Republic of Kosovo”. These bizarre provisions and the Constitution as 
whole which are prepared and enforced to destroy perhaps the cleanest population in Europe from sexually 
transmitted diseases, are repeatedly called in the media by Kosovo’s President Fatmir Sjediu and Deputy 
Prime Minister Hajredin Kuçi, as “the Bible and the Koran of Kosovo”. Both of them are professors of 
constitutional right at the Faculty of Law of the Pristina University. Calling these things the Bible and the 
Koran or something sacred, is beyond every rational thinking. President Sejdiu’s official speech is available 
here: http://www.telegrafi.com/?id=26&a=506, accessed on November 2008. It is in Albanian, but every 
reader familiar with Latin, Germanic and Roman languages and characters can easy understand the title. Of 
least importance in Kosovo’s Constitution is Chapter X – Local Government and Territorial Organisation (2 
articles in one page) to be followed by preceding Chapter IX – Economic Relations (4 articles in one page 
and a half).         29 
problems without the fear that someone may be executed as counter revolutionary 
(like in the FSU during the 1930s) and his/her writings banned, interned to the 
countryside (like in China in early years of communism), or sentenced to 9 years in 
prison for liberal ideas (like in the former SFRY after the split with the FSU and 
introduction of self-management).  Moreover, the studies on transition economics 
still  have  to  clarify  with  analyses  the  meaning  of  some  terms  such  as 
transformation, transition and evolution.  
  
Self-management socialism by no doubts was a more advanced economic model 
than  centrally  planed  socialism,  both  in  terms  of  theoretical  perspective  and 
practice.  The  market  played  a  role  in  self-management  and  that  is  why  its 
alternative name was market socialism. It was much different from the Soviet type 
socialism despite that it evolved from that copy in the early 1950s, and begun 
transition to a full market economy approximately in the same period as centralist 
socialism in other CEE countries. The outbreak of the civil wars and disintegration 
of the former SFRY overshadowed analyses and left many questions unanswered 
as  what  “surprises  or  failure”  the  transition  of  this  model  might  have  had  in 
peaceful time. For the rest of CEE economies, transition surprises are known; the 
rising of income inequalities, high unemployment and deepening of poverty at the 
expense of majority for the benefits of few in power. Leaving aside the impact of 
war, a similar path has followed the transition of self-management, which to some 
extent appears to be not a desired or correct path. 
 
As a theory and practice, self-management had more in common with SMEC than 
centrally  planned  socialism  and  new  liberal  economy,  excluding  the  issue  of 
property rights. Self-management could more easier make transition to a SMEC 
than to current condition in which it is and looks like early capitalist development or 
“wild capitalism” with rent seeking behaviours and the risk of social tensions within 
and between countries. Unsatisfactory economic conditions of successor states of 
the former SFRY that are waiting to become EU members. To make their journey 
easier towards that target more feasible, these countries need to make another 
transition in different meaning – they need to reform their economies a lot from   30 
social perspective. The reforms towards SMEC are in line with the requirements of 
the other EU countries, regardless that the EU has not yet unified this model in her 
Constitution.  When  it  comes  to  the  critique  or  further  reforming  (for  which  the 
debate is actually going on), or eventually giving it up, the theory certainly will find 
alternatives. But let the SMEC first give economic effects it has given in Germany 
after  WWII,  then  there  will  be  time  for  alternatives.  With  unemployment  and 
poverty running at double digits in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, FYR 
Macedonia, and Montenegro, the general public finds it hard to agree with current 
“wild capitalism” that may take long time to substantially reduce unemployment 
and poverty. The current course of economic development should be changed to 
the concepts of SMEC and some of the self-management which more or less are 
found to be convergent. There is no way to the past and the name communism, 
but to the concepts of operation, whatever they might be called, that make a better 
allocation and utilisation of resources – the basic concept of economics. This is 
what matters above all, irrespective of ideologies.  
 
It is not so important how much resources the countries under consideration have 
at their disposal for social policies to provide a better welfare for the population. 
Behaviour and the way how existing resources are allocated and used, which at 
present are found to increase income differentiation. This is an important topic to 
be investigated in future research. Furthermore, in addition to the categories of 
social  policies  presented  in  Table  1  and  discussed  hereto,  future  interesting 
discussion or research may include: human development, minimum wage policies, 
pension  reforms,  family  issues  (maternity  leave,  child  allowances),  education 
(illiteracy  and  child  labour),  regional  economic  development,  and  economic 
competitiveness of the countries from social development perspective.    31 
Appendix: Some of the main economic indicators of SFRY and her successor states 
  Population  GDP per capita (in $)  Gini Coefficient  Unemployment rate (in %) 
Countries  1990
a)  2007(in mil.)
b)  1990
 a)  2007 (est)
 b)  1989
c)  2002
 c)  2002
 b)  2007
 b) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  4,364,000  3.8  2,490  3,645  n/a  n/a  41.0  39.0 
Croatia  4,784,000  4.4  5,350  12,360  n/a  0.35  14.5  8.3 
FYR Macedonia  2,021,000  2.0  2,180  3,794  0.27  0.27  31.9  34.2 
Kosovo  1,965,000  2.1
d)  1,840  2,005
 d)  n/a  n/a  55.0
 e)  n/a 
Montenegro  652,000  0.7  2,330  4,085  n/a  0.37*  36.7  26.4 
Serbia  5,590,000  7.5  2,970  4,907  n/a  0.37*  29.0  18.1 
Slovenia  1,982,000  2.0  6,940  22,916  0.22  0.30  6.5  4.7 
Vojvodina  2,021,000  **  3,790  **  **  0.37*  **  ** 
Total SFRY  23,451,000  22.5  3,587  7,673***  -  -  -  - 
* Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo). 
** Included in Serbia; 
*** The EBRD statistics lists the measures of GDP in the countries’ national currency but GDP per capita in US Dollars ($) for all of them; 
“n/a” data not available or could not be obtained.  
“-“ not applicable.  
 
Sources: 
a) World Bank (1991), World Development Report 1991: The Challenge of Development, New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 
Statistical Annex, Tables 1 and 2; 
b) 
 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development – EBRD (2008), Transition Report: Growth in Transition, London: EBRD, statistics 
accessed online;  
c) 
 Sukiassyan, Grigor (2007), “Inequality and Growth: what Does the Transition Economy Data Say?”, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 35, 
No. 1, pp. 35-56, table 3, op. cit.; 
d) International Monetary Fund – IMF (2008), Aide Memories of the IMF Staff Mission to Kosovo, April 21 to 29, 2008, Washington D.C.: IMF, 
Table 1;  
e) World Bank (2007), Kosovo Poverty Assessment: Accelerating Inclusive Growth to Reduce Widespread Poverty, Vol. 1, Report No. 39737, 
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit of the World Bank, Washington D.C.: World Bank.  
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